Diversité et Identité Culturelle en Europe

FONDEMENTS DU DIALOGUE CULTUREL


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Abstract:
Philosophy has until present time a stable usage of the term and concept of the ‘sphere’ as a part of the representation of the world around us. We trace this path of the ‘sphere’ in the Western philosophy and the status the concepts of ‘world’, ‘universe’, and ‘sphere’ had for the worldview of philosophers in the history of the Western culture. We will show that recently European philosophers have joint this concept of the ‘sphere’ with the idea of ‘globalization’. But before the emergence of ‘globalization’ the previous conceptualizations of the ‘world’ in philosophy have had a different function than in contemporary political and economic thinking of the discourse of ‘globalization’. For the philosopher it established the reality, which surrounds the human, while the economic and political proponents of ‘globalization’ describe and use ‘globalization’ as a process they are performing. Even the contemporary philosophers using ‘globalization’ refer to this complex discourse.

Keywords:
1. Introduction: The Discourse of Philosophy of the ‘World’:
A Distinction of the Concepts ‘World’, ‘Universe’, and ‘Cosmos’
vs. the Human Being

Many aspects of philosophy concern the world around us; so philosophy is interested in the origin and order of the world in the sense of the surrounding reality, asks about the conditions of this reality and the perception of it, and the separation of the human ‘I’ or ‘Ego’ and the surrounding world. But also the evolutionary and social development of the world around us from a historical perspective as described by Marx concerns philosophers. The question of the representation of the world in our language and the interaction of mind, language, and the reality around us are also topics of philosophy inquiring the world around us. ‘World’, ‘universe’, and ‘sphere’ are used in philosophical writings as the concepts, which refer to the reality the human is located in; this reality is often the counterpoint to the human experienced by the person as the otherness of the world, which we perceive through our senses and arrange in our mind. The relationship between both, ‘human’ and ‘world’, and the conditions of the reception of the ‘world’ in the mind of the human are discussed in philosophical discourses. On other words expressed: The philosophers’ ‘world’ is a conceptual term and in some regard a metaphorical placeholder for the representation of the surrounding environment. As such, it is only distinguishable from the human as the area the human operates in and experiences as different from himself or herself. It seems like the philosophers used since antiquity used the concepts of ‘word’, ‘universe’, and ‘cosmos’ as the framing markers of their thinking mind, which aimed at the most abstract and commonly acceptable concepts humans are able to think about. So the early Greek philosophers have used the term ‘cosmos’ for the universe in an ordered way as a whole; the ‘spheres’ were considered even still in Christian thinking as the separated parts of the
world, which surrounded the earth, until the scholars in Renaissance started with their inquiry of the world using the natural sciences and distancing themselves from the religious answers. But the idea of the areas of the world around us was still formulated after the paradigm change of the sciences gave up the ideas of the layers or spheres of the world. In logic the ‘universe of discourse’ is a class, which brings a virtually endless number of arguments, which can be derives from it. ‘Cosmos’ means according to the *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (2000) the universe regarded as an orderly, harmonious whole, an ordered, harmonious whole, and harmony and order as distinct from chaos. Cosmos in *Collins English Dictionary* (2003) means the world or universe considered as an ordered system, any ordered system, harmony, and order. The word ‘cosmos’ is known since 1150–1200 and derived from Middle English and Greek *kosmos* for ‘order’, ‘form’, ‘arrangement’, ‘the world’, and ‘universe’. According to *Random House Kernerman Webster's College Dictionary* (2010) ‘cosmos’ means the world or universe regarded as an orderly, harmonious system, a complete, orderly, harmonious system, an order and harmony, and any of a genus, Cosmos, of New World composite plants having open clusters of flowers with red or yellow disks and wide rays of white, pink, or purple. In contemporary research literature regarding philosophy the concept ‘sphere’ is used, which can be traced back to the earliest Greek philosophy and cosmological writings. Habermas as social philosopher of pragmatism made the ‘public sphere’ as the place of structural transformation in social theory and epistemology famous. The ‘universe of discourse’ or ‘domain of discourse’ is in logic a class containing all the entities referred to in a discourse or an argument. In formal logic the argument is defined by this ‘universe of discourse’. Every argument or statement made in that universe applies to all entities of the universe. Volkmer uses the term ‘global public sphere’: ‘The strategy of
international communication theory, should be to develop a methodology for the understanding of 'particular' interpretations, meanings, relevances of the global public sphere, to detect the specifics of this communication space for different world regions - in times of peace and times of crisis.” Fiss and Hirsch (2005: 30) stated that “how major events are constructed in public discourse continues to be a topic of interest across disciplines. Particularly large-scale transformations such as industrialization, the emergence of capitalism, democratization, or globalization are marked by discursive struggles over their social and cultural impacts, and the outcome of these struggles may facilitate or impede the transformations’ widespread acceptance.” Brendel (1997) in Symbolism of the Sphere. A Contribution to the History of Earlier Greek Philosophy described the concept of the ‘sphere’ of ancient scholars. Robertson (2009) published under the title Spheres of Reason his New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. Inglis (1998) published Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy. Volkmer (2013) wrote that “it can be argued, that fantasies and ‘ideas’ of the ‘world’ as a somehow common place have existed since Plato described in his dialogue Timaeus the history of the world by the affiliation of the four elements to each other, since Aristotle defined the 'world state', since Francis Bacon distinguished between different world concepts ‘globus terrestris’, and ‘globus intellectualis’. It was idea of a 'world society' as a universe of nature and reasoning, a global arena for public debate during the Enlightenment which has inaugurated modernity. Postmodern thinkers replaced 'reasoning' by 'simulation' and Hegel's term of 'World Spirit' ('Weltgeist') by an idea of 'instant' truth, created by the media and conveying the image of a shrinking world.” A sphere is a three-dimensional geometrical perfectly round form. The English word ‘sphere’ derived from Greek σφαίρα and Latin sphaera for ‘ball’ and ‘globe’. The Greek word σφαίρα for ‘ball’ occurred in the Odysee
(6.100) in the expression σφαίρε παίζειν ‘play at ball’. As the hollow sphere or globe it was used in the ancient physics since the time of Anaximander. It was believed that the spheres revolve around the earth carrying the heavenly bodies. According to the Pythagoreans the spheres were arranged after the intervals of the musical scale. Aristotle used the word in his *Metaphysics* (1073b18). (Liddell; Scott) In philosophy the concept of the ‘public sphere’ was introduced by Habermas. Sloterdijk makes the extension as the ‘globe’ in connection with the concept of ‘globalization’. The ‘world’ was since oldest Greek philosophers practiced philosophy a philosophical concept. Since antiquity in logic the ‘universe of discourse’ or ‘domain of discourse is a class containing all the entities referred to in a discourse or an argument. In other words expressed: the argument is defined by this ‘universe of discourse’. Every argument or statement, which is made in that universe, applies to all entities of the universe. How much this concept touched the natural sciences and the humanities at the same time can be seen in the writing *A Letter to a Friend Wherein is Plainly Shewn that it is Impossible to Understand the Classick Authors, or the Modern Philosophy, without Knowing the Globe, Sphere, and Geography. Whereunto is Annexed a Refutation of this Proposition, Cartesius est Materialiter Atheus* was published in Dublin on the 6th of December 1711. Actually, ‘globalization’ has in the field of philosophy less place to be an important field of studies. It can be treated by philosophers like any other subject within the methodology of philosophy. From the perspective of philosophy, the term ‘globalization’ was subject to critical commentaries since it raised in the 70s of the last century. Schneewind (2002: 169-178) discussed globalization in the history of philosophy. Scheuerman (2013) wrote on ‘globalization’ in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*: “The term globalization has only become commonplace in the last two decades, and academic commentators who employed the term as late as the 1970s
accurately recognized the novelty of doing so. At least since the advent of
industrial capitalism, however, intellectual discourse has been replete with
allusions to phenomena strikingly akin to those that have garnered the
attention of recent theorists of globalization.” The raising interest in
‘globalization’ from the perspective of the philosophy of the 20th and 21st
century cannot be seen in another way than the co-incidence of this
buzzword of the economic and trade organizations, which promote
‘globalization’, and the long history of the conceptual usage of terminology
of the semantic field of the ‘cosmos’, the ‘universe’ and the ‘spheres’
within them. The earliest philosophers used this terminology, since they
were in the position of being universal scholars, which did not separate the
different fields of their studies.

2. The World in German Philosophy of the 19th Century

Plato’s Politics can be considered the first philosopher who used for
politics the term ‘sphere of action’. Aristotle in his Politics (book 4, section
1300b) writes that a ‘difference among judicial courts’ rests upon ‘three
determinants’, which are ‘constituents’, ‘sphere of action’, and ‘mode of
appointment’. The usage of globalization for the area of culture can be
 traced back to Hegel’s work The Phenomenology of Mind. The in Free
Concrete Mind: Spirit in the section The Spirit in Self-Estrangement (I. b.
Belief and Pure Insight (1); 1. Belief and Pure Insight) Hegel states that
“the spiritual condition of self-estrangement exists in the sphere of culture
as a fact.” Hegel in Science of Logic also speaks about the ‘spiritual sphere’
with an ‘infinitely manifold content that is communicable’. Hegel in his
Aesthetics (Lectures on Aesthetics. Volume 2. Part III. The System of the
Individual Arts) wrote as introduction to this part about art, which resides in
*the sphere of the universal world-views*:
“This realization of the Ideal amounted only to the still purely inner production of art within the sphere of the universal world-views into which it was elaborated. But it is implicit in the very conception of beauty that it shall make itself objective externally as a work of art presented to immediate vision, to sense and sensuous imagination. Consequently it is only through this existent, which is appropriate to itself, that beauty really explicitly becomes beauty and the Ideal. Therefore, thirdly, we still have to survey this sphere in which the work of art is actualized in the element of the sensuous. For only in virtue of this final configuration is the work of art genuinely concrete, an individual at once real, singular, and perfect.”

Hegel used for the traditional separations of areas the concept ‘sphere’. Hegel also employed the terms in order to distinguish between the private and public area; at this time, this was the mental framework for the rise of the democracy in Europe during the 19th century. Kant used the expression ‘sphere of a concept’ as a metaphoric term for the extension of a concept. Kant (1787) in Critique of Pure Reason in II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method (§ II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of its Polemical Employment) described the earth:

“If I represent the earth, as it appears to my senses, as a flat surface with a circular horizon, I cannot know how far it extends. But experience teaches me that, how far soever I go, I always see before me a space in which I can proceed farther; and thus I know the limits of my actual knowledge of the earth at any given time, but not the limits of all possible geography. But if I have got so far as to know that the earth is a sphere, and that its surface is spherical, I am able even from a small part of it, for instance, from the magnitude of a degree, to know determinately, in accordance with principles a priori,
the diameter and through it the total superficial area of the earth; and although I am ignorant of the objects which this surface may contain, I yet have knowledge of its limits and extent.”

The archetypical usage of the spherical concept of financial globalization we find in the work of Marx. Marx used in his economic manuscripts of the *Capital* (Vol. I. Chapter Six) the expression ‘sphere of circulation’. In the *Capital* (Volume II; Chapter 1) *The Circuit of Money Capital* Marx deals with the changes in form (or metamorphoses) of capital in the ‘sphere of circulation’. Scheuermann (2013) in the article *Globalization* of the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* wrote on Marx’ contribution to ‘globalization’: “Another German émigré, the socialist theorist Karl Marx, in 1848 formulated the first theoretical explanation of the sense of territorial compression that so fascinated his contemporaries. In Marx's account, the imperatives of capitalist production inevitably drove the bourgeoisie to “nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, and establish connections everywhere.” Marx described that new technologies “provided the necessary infrastructure for a cosmopolitan future socialist civilization, while simultaneously functioning in the present as indispensable organizational tools for a working class destined to undertake a revolution no less oblivious to traditional territorial divisions than the system of capitalist exploitation it hoped to dismantle.” Prior the Marx’ historical materialism, concepts like ‘*Weltgeist*’ (‘world spirit’) and ‘*Weltseele*’ (‘world soul’) emerged in the second half of the 19th century in the German philosophy. Hegel and Schopenhauer use the concept ‘world’ in this context. The world as an idea and the will of the human was the opus magnum of Schopenhauer and is an important work for the relationship between the mind and the reality of the human. Schopenhauer in *The World As Will And Idea* in *First Book. The World As Idea. First Aspect. The Idea Subordinated To The Principle Of Sufficient Reason: The Object Of*
Experience And Science formulated that the world is the idea of the mind, when saying:

“§ 1. ‘The world is my idea:’—this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world which surrounds him is there only as idea, i.e., only in relation to something else, the consciousness, which is himself.”

The statement ‘The world is idea’ Schopenhauer traces back as a ‘truth’ involved in the skeptical reflections from which Descartes started, which Berkeley distinctly enunciated, and Kant's missed to respect as a ‘principle’. This ‘truth’ Schopenhauer traced back to the wise men of India as “appearing indeed as the fundamental tenet of the Vedânta philosophy ascribed to Vyasa”. Schopenhauer wrote:

“For as the world is in one aspect entirely idea, so in another it is entirely will. A reality which is neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which the thing in itself has unfortunately dwindled in the hands of Kant), is the phantom of a dream, and its acceptance is an ignis fatuus in philosophy.”

Schopenhauer wrote about concepts:

“§ 9. Concepts form a distinct class of ideas, existing only in the mind of man, and entirely different from the ideas of perception which
we have considered up till now. We can therefore never attain to a sensuous and, properly speaking, evident knowledge of their nature, but only to a knowledge which is abstract and discursive. It would, therefore, be absurd to demand that they should be verified in experience, if by experience is meant the real external world, which consists of ideas of perception, or that they should be brought before the eyes or the imagination like objects of perception. They can only be thought, not perceived, and only the effects which men accomplish through them are properly objects of experience. Such effects are language, preconceived and planned action and science, and all that results from these. Speech, as an object of outer experience, is obviously nothing more than a very complete telegraph, which communicates arbitrary signs with the greatest rapidity and the finest distinctions of difference.”

In the third book Schopenhauer describes the states of the world as ‘idea’ and as ‘will’:

“When the Platonic Idea appears, in it subject and object are no longer to be distinguished, for the Platonic Idea, the adequate objectivity of will, the true world as idea, arises only when the subject and object reciprocally fill and penetrate each other completely; and in the same way the knowing and the known individuals, as things in themselves, are not to be distinguished. For if we look entirely away from the true world as idea, there remains nothing but the world as will. The will is the “in-itself” of the Platonic Idea, which fully objectifies it; it is also the “in-itself” of the particular thing and of the individual that knows it, which objectify it incompletely. As will, outside the idea and all its forms, it is one and the same in the object
contemplated and in the individual, who soars aloft in this contemplation, and becomes conscious of himself as pure subject.”

The mental place for the production of ideas is the genius:

“§ 37. Genius, then, consists, according to our explanation, in the capacity for knowing, independently of the principle of sufficient reason, not individual things, which have their existence only in their relations, but the Ideas of such things, and of being oneself the correlative of the Idea, and thus no longer an individual, but the pure subject of knowledge.”

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1921, 2013) writes in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:

1. The world is everything that is the case.
   1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
   1.11 The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the facts.
   1.12 For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and also all that is not the case.
   1.13 The facts in logical space are the world.
1.2 The world divides into facts.
   1.21 Any one can either be the case or not be the case, and everything else remain the same.

Wittgenstein defines the ‘total reality’ as ‘world’:

2.063 The total reality is the world.
For Wittgenstein the representation through depiction of the world is possible via the ‘logical picture’:

2.182 Every picture is also a logical picture.
(On the other hand, for example, not every picture is spatial.)
2.19 The logical picture can depict the world.

Wittgenstein’s statement that the proposition can produce a ‘world’ indicates that the mind is also able to produce a ‘world’ of its concepts:

4.023 The proposition determines reality to this extent, that one only needs to say “Yes” or “No” to it to make it agree with reality. It must therefore be completely described by the proposition. A proposition is the description of a fact. As the description of an object describes it by its external properties so propositions describe reality by its internal properties. The proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding, and therefore one can actually see in the proposition all the logical features possessed by reality if it is true. One can draw conclusions from a false proposition.

1. The ‘Universe of Discourse’ in the U.S. American Philosophy of Peirce and Marcuse
The discourse is the philosophical form of a dissertation both orally or in a written form. As such, the discourse is a functional format of thinking and not a literary genre. Of course we can distinguish the discourse of the philosophers as a unit and a distinct literary feature. But the main functions of the discourse are the communication of mental contents in a formal way.
The Greek word διάλεξις means 'discourse' and 'argument'. More as a communicative linguistic form the word διάλεκτος for 'discourse' and 'conversation' and διαλάλησις for 'talking' and 'discourse' were used. The action of having a discourse was described by the verb λογέω. In the formal language of rhetoric λογία and λαλιά were formats of discourse. The usage of the expression 'universe of discourse' is a relative new concept of the early 20th century logic of the U.S. American logician Pierce. Pierce (2013) gives the following definition of the 'universe of discourse': "The universe of discourse is the aggregate of the individual objects which "exist," that is are independently side by side in the collection of experiences to which the deliverer and interpreter of a set of symbols have agreed to refer and to consider." (The Principles of Logical Graphics, MS 493, n.d.) Pierce (1906; 2013) wrote: in 'The Bedrock beneath Pragmaticism'

"...the Phemic Sheet iconizes the Universe of Discourse, since it more immediately represents a field of Thought, or Mental Experience, which is itself directed to the Universe of Discourse, and considered as a sign, denotes that Universe. Moreover, it [is because it must be understood] as being directed to that Universe, that it is iconized by the Phemic Sheet. So, on the principle that logicians call "the Nota notae" that the sign of anything, X, is itself a sign of the very same X, the Phemic Sheet, in representing the field of attention, represents the general object of that attention, the Universe of Discourse." (The Bedrock beneath Pragmaticism', CP 4.561n1, c. 1906).

Pierce (Universe 1902; 2013) also describes the origin of the term 'university of discourse':

"... Universe (in logic) of discourse, of a proposition, &c. In every proposition the circumstances of its enunciation show that it refers to some collection of individuals or of possibilities, which cannot be adequately described, but can only be indicated as something familiar to both speaker
and auditor. At one time it may be the physical universe of sense (1) [Note (Commens): This refers to the previous item in the DPP], at another it may be the imaginary "world" of some play or novel, at another a range of possibilities. The term was introduced by De Morgan in 1846 (Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, viii, 380) but De Morgan never showed that he fully comprehended it. It does not seem to be absolutely necessary in all cases that there should be an index proper outside the symbolic terms of the proposition to show what it is that is referred to; but in general there is such an index in the environment common to speaker and auditor. This De Morgan has not remarked; but what he has remarked has likewise its importance, namely, that for the purposes of logic it makes no difference whether the universe be wide or narrow. The idea of a limited logical universe was adopted by Boole and has been employed by all subsequent exact logicians. There is besides a universe of marks or characters, whenever marks are considered substantively, that is, as abstractions, as they commonly are in ordinary speech, even though the forms of language do not show it. Thus only, there comes to be a material difference between an affirmative and a negative proposition. For it will then alone be one thing to say that an object wants some character common to all men and another to say that it possesses every character common to all non-men. Only instead of giving three qualities it gives four, for the assertion may be that an object wants some character common to all men; a point made by ancient writers. In 1882 O. C. Mitchell extended the theory of the logical universe by the introduction of the idea of 'dimension'." (Universe (2), DPP 2 / CP 2.536, 1902) In Minute Logic (1902; 2013) Pierce explains with the example of the class of people introduced to the Eleusian mysteries that every one of them, but no people of another class, experienced the feeling of awe and participates in this 'universe of discourse':
"... I wish my description of what is true or false, to apply to what is not only true or false generally, but also to what is true or false under conditions already assumed. Whatever may be the limitations previously imposed, that to which the truth or falsity is limited may be called the universe of discourse. For example, at the mention of a certain name, every person initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries invariably experiences a feeling of awe. This is true. It is therefore true that every person initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries always experiences a sentiment of awe; not universally, but only under the limitations already understood before this is said." ('Minute Logic', CP 6.351, c. 1902).

The next statement of Pierce is interesting, since it concerns the aspect of the imagination as a field of experience, a situation, which we can use to describe the state of 'globalization': "When the universe of discourse relates to a common experience, but this experience is of something imaginary, as when we discuss the world of Shakespeare's creation in the play of Hamlet, we find individual distinction existing so far as the work of imagination has carried it, while beyond that point there is vagueness and generality. So, in the discussion of the consequences of a mathematical hypothesis, as long as we keep to what is distinctly posited and its positive implications, we find discrete elements, but when we pass to mere possibilities, the individuals merge together. This remark will be fully illustrated in the sequel." ('Multitude and Number', CP 4.172, 1897)

Marcuse in One-Dimensional Man in the chapter The Closing of the Universe of Discourse wrote that the ‘language of total administration’ mediates between the masters and their dependents. “Its publicity agents shape the universe of communication in which the one-dimensional behaviour expresses itself.” Such a language produces a discourse, “which is deprived of the mediations which are the stages of the process of cognition and cognitive evaluation. The concepts which comprehend the
facts and thereby transcend the facts are losing their authentic linguistic representation. Without these mediations, language tends to express and promote the immediate identification of reason and fact, truth and established truth, essence and existence, the thing and its function.” Marcuse depicts a state of power, when ‘functionalization of language’ helps to ‘repel non-conformist elements’ from the structure and movement of speech.

“In this behavioral universe, words and concepts tend to coincide, or rather the concept tends to be absorbed by the word. The former has no other content than that designated by the word in the publicized and standardized usage, and the word is expected to have no other response than the publicized and standardized behaviour (reaction). The word becomes cliché and, as cliché, governs the speech or the writing; the communication thus precludes genuine development of meaning. To be sure, any language contains innumerable terms which do not require development of their meaning, such as the terms designating the objects and implements of daily life, visible nature, vital needs and wants. These terms are generally understood so that their mere appearance produces a response (linguistic or operational) adequate to the pragmatic context in which they are spoken.”

Marcuse described here the impact of a functionalized language, which as an absolute power destroys the values of the discourse. As assemblage of cliché the language is dead and formal serving as the framework of a totalitarian discourse. This state Marcuse marks as the end of the ‘universe of discourse’.
2. The ‘World’ in European Philosophy of the 21st Century: Habermas, Sloterdijk, and Nancy

In *Minima Moralia* Theodor Adorno 1951 criticized that ‘What philosophy once called life, has turned into the sphere of the private and then merely of consumption’. Habermas published 2006 *Religion in the Public Sphere*. Habermas described the communicative situation of the 20th and the 21st century with the distinction between the public and the private sphere across his writings. Scheuermann (2013) in the article *Globalization* of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy wrote on Heidegger’s contribution to ‘globalization’: “But it was probably the German philosopher Martin Heidegger who most clearly anticipated contemporary debates about globalization. Heidegger not only described the “abolition of distance” as a constitutive feature of our contemporary condition, but he linked recent shifts in spatial experience to no less fundamental alterations in the temporality of human activity: “All distances in time and space are shrinking. Man now reaches overnight, by places, places which formerly took weeks and months of travel” (Heidegger 1950, 165).”

In the encyclopedia article *The Public Sphere*, which appeared 1964 written by Habermas (1974: 49) in New German Critique the concept of the ‘public sphere’ is explained as follows: “We mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.' They then behave neither like business or professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to
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express and publish their opinions-about matters of general interest.”

Habermas lets the concept of the ‘public sphere’ begin with the European Renaissance stating that “there is no indication European society of the high middle ages possessed a public sphere as a unique realm distinct from the private sphere. Nevertheless, it was not coincidental that during that period symbols of sovereignty, for instance the princely seal, were deemed ‘public’.” (1964: 54) Habermas in his article stated that the end of the ‘civil society’ with its ‘social welfare state’ will starts with the ‘structural transformation’ of the ‘public sphere itself’. “The idea of the public sphere, preserved in the social welfare state mass democracy, an idea which calls for a rationalization of power through the medium of public discussion among private individuals, threatens to disintegrate with the structural transformation of the public sphere itself. It could only be realized today, on an altered basis, as a rational reorganization of social and political power under the mutual control of rival organizations committed to the public sphere in their internal structure as well as in their relations with the state and each other.” (1964: 55) The ‘transformation’ is the usual term in the discourse of the proponents of the ‘globalization’ for the changes that ‘globalization’ brings in several parts of the world. But while Habermans sees this process of transformation as a problematic state, the organizations, which promote ‘globalization’ consider it a positive process. Nearly 50 years later, in 2013, in his lecture Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis Habermas on the 26th of April 2013 at the Catholic University of Leuven said that “the European Central Bank, the Commission, and the European Court of Justice have intervened most profoundly in the everyday lives of European citizens over the decades, even though these institutions are the least subject to democratic controls.” The lack of relations and representation of the ‘formation of the will and opinion’ of citizens of the democracy of Europe and the policies made by European institutions is the
critical point Habermas mentioned: “Thus, to the present day there remains a gulf at the European level between the citizens’ opinion- and will-formation, on the one hand, and the policies actually adopted to solve the pressing problems, on the other.” According to Habermas ironically that “what unite the European citizens today are the Eurosceptical mindsets that have become more pronounced in all of the member countries during the crisis, albeit in each country for different and rather polarizing reasons.” As solution Habermas presents here the concepts of ‘Sittlichkeit’ (‘morality’) and ‘solidarity’.

Sloterdijk developed an account of globalization with the historical and philosophical consequences of the earth considered to be as a globe and ‘globalization’ as the last phase in a process staring first with the circumnavigation of the earth. In the last phase of globalization the world system as a capitalist system determines the conditions of life. The original book in German was published in 2005 with the title Im Weltinnenraum des Kapitals (2005) as ‘a philosophical theory of globalization’. Sloterdijk presents a philosophy of space in the Sphären-trilogy of ‘terrestrial globalization’. (2005: 14) The globe is a philosophical concept (Globus, Kugel, sphaira) resulting from ‘terrestrial globalization’ (2005: 37) Terrestrial globalization is the process of material expansion, which Sloterdijk calls ‘world history in a philosophical sense’ (2005: 28). After the ‘terrestrial globalization’ a ‘cosmic-Uranian’ or ‘morphological globalization’ followed, which began with the Greek culture and after this stage a ‘electronic globalization’. The Weltinnenraum (‘world interior’) of this sphere and age is the result from the contraction of the world by money (‘capital’). Sloterdijk wrote the trilogy Spheres, which was published 1998, 1999, and 2004. ‘Spheres’ are for Sloterdijk ‘spaces of coexistence’. Sloterdijk argued that the current concept of globalization lacks a historical perspective.
In the work of the philosopher Nancy the philosophical concept ‘world’ is a main theme besides *Le Sens du Monde* the book *La Creation du Monde ou la Mondalisation* focuses of this topic. Nancy’s *La Creation du Monde ou la Mondalisation* was translated as *The Creation of the World or ‘Globalization’*. The expression of the process of ‘world-becoming’ (‘mondanisation’) was used by Nancy (2007: 44) In the author’s *Prefatory Note to the English Language Edition. Note on the Untranslatable Mondialisation* (2007: 23) Nancy writes that “it is not without paradox that in many languages the French term mondialisation is quite difficult to translate, and that perhaps this difficulty makes it almost ‘untranslatable’.” Nancy (2007: 23) writes that “the French language has used the word mondialisation since the middle of the twentieth century, which seems to me slightly before the term globalization appeared in English.” In the author's *Prefatory Note to the French Language Edition* Nancy (2007: 29) writes that ‘the creation of the world or globalization’ as a conjunction must be “understood simultaneously and alternatively in its disjunctive, substitutive, or conjunctive senses. According to the first sense: between the creation of the world or globalization, one must choose, since one implies the exclusion of the other. According to the second sense: the creation of the world, in other words globalization, the former must be understood as the latter. According to the third sense: the creation of the world or globalization, one or the other indifferently, leads us to a similar result (which remains to be determined).” Nancy also describes related concepts. In *Urbi et Orbi* Rome is presented as the paradigm for the concept of ‘urbanization’. Nancy (2007: 31) writes here regarding ‘urbi et orbi’ that “this formulation drawn from papal benediction has come to mean ‘everywhere and anywhere’ in ordinary language.” Nancy (2007: 32) writes that the ‘urbanization’ is the process, when “the city spreads and extends all the way to the point where, while it tends to cover the entire orb of the
planet, it loses its properties as a city, and, of course with them, those properties that would allow it to be distinguished from a ‘country’.” Nancy (2007: 33) writes that “the West has come to encompass the word, and in this movement it disappears as what was supposed to orient the course of this world. For all that, up until now, one cannot say that any other configuration of the world or any other philosophy of the universal and of reason have challenged that course.” Nancy (2007: 33) writes that “the world has lost its capacity to ‘form a world’ (‘faire monde): it seems only to have gained that capacity of proliferating, to the extent of its means, the ‘un-world’ (immonde), which, until now, and whatever one may think of retrospective illusions, has never in history impacted the totality of the orb to such an extent. In the end, everything takes place as if the world affected and permeated itself with a death drive that soon would have nothing else to destroy than the world itself.” Nancy distinguishes ‘globalisation’ (‘globalization’) and ‘mondialisation’ (‘world-forming’). Nancy provides a philosophical reflection of the phenomenon of globalization. Nancy takes the linguistic sophistical approach, which attaches to the word specific meanings. On the contrary, the approach of Sloterdijk is a historical analysis and interpretation of the history of humanity under the aspect of ‘globalization’. While Sloterdijk extends the concept ‘globalization’ in the historical dimension as a process and thus contributed to historical understanding of this concept, Nancy analyses this concept. Sloterdik sets up a discourse, where he interprets things as items of ‘globalization’. The criticism of this procedure would be the accusation of historical revisionism. But what Sloterdijk here does, it the setting of absolute terms, which derive like the terms of ‘globalization’ from a constructed and inorganic background. These terms are a framework set up to imitate the discourse; these terms are conceptual and not historical. In the case of Sloterdijks’s terms, the terms are bound to a discourse, which is supporting
the idea of ‘globalization’ and actually supports the power construction of the contemporary promoting organizations of ‘globalization’ as positive and evolutionary developed from a historical background, which Sloterdijk depicts.

3. Conclusions:

The Results of the ‘Universe of Discourse’ of ‘Globalization’ for the ‘World’

We can consider ‘globalization’ to be part of an argument. Here now the discourse applies to all entities of the class that they belong to the ‘world’ as expressed in the literal meaning of ‘globalization’. As a noun for a process this word claims that the ‘globalization’ is a permanent process. Like all the followers of the Eleusian Mysteries as a class of humans among all humans are the ones, which participate in the feeling of awe, in the case of the globalization the class of people involved in it participate in the experience of the ‘global’. This experience is not a real and physical experience, but the experience of the world around them as ‘global’. In order to illustrate the difference we can give the following example: While someone without the idea of ‘globalization’ living in the U.S. does not associate with McDonalds idea of globalization, but a traditional U.S. American brand and a local tradition, a person from another culture who visits McDonalds for the first time will consider the restaurant as a contribution to the ‘globalization’ of his/her country. We have seen that Marcuse demonstrated that the ‘functional language’ leads to the end of the discourse, since its authoritarian form builds up structures, which set borders. Marcuse also stated that this “functional language is a radically anti-historical language: operational rationality has little room and little use for historical reason.” Formal languages like the languages of computer languages, but also the formalized language of business communication, of administration, and of ‘globalization’ allow the consumer only to participate in the discourse, when the concepts and terms of this language are accepted and used. How regulative such a language operates, we can see
in the case of Sloterdijk’s conceptualization of the ‘globalization’ as historical principle. The language the philosopher used becomes formal and consists of neologisms, which extend the discourse of ‘globalization’. But these terms lack any historical documentation. These terms are invented and created in order to build a discourse around them. The problem is that formal languages are logically correct, but de facto not in any case acceptable as truth. This phenomenon is known as the problem of the fallacies, which a language through wrong reasoning can produce. At the point, where a term is not a historically grown term, but an invented term, the discourse cannot be traced back to the history and the discourse of it loses the relation to the past of traditional and cultural background. This state we can see as pars pro toto in the conceptualization of ‘globalization’ of Sloterdijk, but the actual discourse about ‘globalization’ shows a similar usage of absolute terminology, which destroys the organic and historical language with words of historical of paths tracing back to democracy, religion, and other organic social structures and with this process the representations of political and cultural developments.

4. Works Cited


